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j Abstract The ability of humans to predict and
explain other people’s behaviour by attributing
independent mental states such as desires and beliefs
to them, is considered to be due to our ability to
construct a ‘‘Theory of Mind’’. Recently, several
neuroimaging studies have implicated the medial
frontal lobes as playing a critical role in a dedicated
‘‘mentalizing’’ or ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ network in the
human brain. In this study we compare the perfor-
mance of patients with right and left medial prefrontal
lobe lesions in theory of mind and in social cognition
tasks, with the performance of people with schizo-
phrenia.We report a similar social cognitive proﬁle
between patients with prefrontal lobe lesions and
schizophrenic subjects in terms of understanding of
false beliefs, in understanding social situations and in
using tactical strategies. These ﬁndings are relevant
for the functional anatomy of ‘‘Theory of Mind’’.
j Key words schizophrenia Æ frontal lobe lesions Æ
Theory of Mind Æ social cognition
Introduction
Social cognition refers to the ability to perceive,
interpret and provide an adequate response to affec-
tive and other interpersonal cues [1]. Pioneering
studies have found that schizophrenic subjects show
social cognitive impairments, in particular in modi-
fying their behaviour when interacting with other
people and in recognizing social information cues [2].
People with schizophrenia also show a great deal of
social naivety in interpersonal situations [3].
The ability to engage in competent social relations
and to understand social information depends on the
adequate functioning of a mental mechanism termed
Theory of Mind (ToM), that allows people to under-
stand and interpret their own and other people’s
mental states and hence to predict and explain their
behaviour [4, 5]. Evidence from neuroimaging and
neuropsychological studies has led researchers to
conclude that ToM is subserved by dedicated brain
systems, including the amygdala, the temporo-parie-
tal junction, the orbital frontal cortex and, in partic-
ular, the medial frontal lobes [6, 7]. The results of
these studies have been used to argue that the medial
frontal lobes play a critical role in a dedicated men-
talizing system [7, 8].
Neuropsychological literature speciﬁcally relevant
to the medial frontal cortex is scarce. Actually, only
three studies have included patients with relatively
focal medial frontal lobe damage and have sought to
investigate correlations between speciﬁc frontal brain
areas and performance in ToM tasks [9–11]. However,
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tions. Stuss et al. [10] reported that patients with right
frontal and bilateral frontal lobe damage were im-
paired in their ability to infer visual experience in
others. The authors conclude that acquired brain
damage to the medial frontal lobes does impact on
ToM ability, but aetiology of brain damage for each
patient is not reported, the text implies that most of
the bifrontal group had suffered head traumas. It is
often very difﬁcult to assess the extent of brain
damage reliably after head trauma as widespread
damage can often occur through axonal shearing and
other effects (e.g. [12]). The second neuropsycholog-
ical study [9] reports that patients with left and right-
sided lesions were equally impaired, while lesion size
was unrelated to performance and no effect of lesion
location was found when comparing patients with
focal dorsolateral, medial or orbital frontal lesions.
Also, a recent group study of empathy in patients
[11] included an assessment of performance on the
Faux Pas Test, a probe of ToM ability. Patients with
frontal lobe lesions were impaired in this task. Spe-
ciﬁcally, patients with ventromedial frontal lobe
damage made signiﬁcantly more errors than patients
with posterior lesions or healthy controls in the Faux
Pas Test.
However, a detailed analysis of lesion sites asso-
ciated with ToM deﬁcits in these previous studies
revealed a particularly important role for the right
ventromedial prefrontal frontal lobe [11, 13]. Damage
in these areas induces behavioural changes affecting
personality (indifference), impaired social judgement,
reduced affect and goal-directed behaviour, self-
monitoring deﬁcits [14–16].
More recent studies have provided evidence that is
in disagreement with a single area hypothesis in-
volved in ToM processing. In fact, the neural network
involving the right and left temporo-parietal-junction
(TPJ R and L); the posterior cingulated (PC), and
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) seems to be crucial
in processing the complex reasoning involved in
mentalizing [17, 18]. Bird et al. [19] studied a patient
affected by extensive damage of the medial frontal
lobes reporting, interestingly, a dysexecutive syn-
drome with confabulation with preserved perfor-
mance on some ToM tasks.
Saxe and Wexler [20] in an fMRI study in normal
subjects, described an equally selective proﬁle of
activation of the above-mentioned areas in a multi-
component pattern of activation fMRI methodology.
Frontal lobe damage in patients has long been linked
to impairments in social behaviour [21]; in fact, they
have been described as presenting diminished social
awareness and a lack of concern for social rules [15,
22].
An interesting approach to social competence
deﬁcits in schizophrenic people may be represented
by the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis (MIH,
[23, 24]).
According to this hypothesis, in the development
of intelligence, social, rather than technical, efﬁciency
represents the main selective pressure of human
evolution [25]. Social efﬁciency is represented by the
ability to understand the intentions and beliefs of
others with the aim of deceiving and manipulating
them to achieve relevant objectives, such as control of
food sources or sexual partners [26]. Recent literature
fosters that these abilities are localised in the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex: selective damage to these
areas causes a relevant impairment of interpersonal
relationships and in regulating behaviour according
to social rules [27–30].
Patients with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex also
have disinhibited/socially inappropriate behaviour.
Grafmaninterpretedthepatient’s impairmentinterms
of an inability to access ‘‘social schema knowledge’’
stored in the frontal lobes [31]. Social schema knowl-
edge is thought to inhibit aberrant behaviour. Patients
with orbitofrontal cortex lesions who cannot access
social schema knowledge fail to inhibit aberrant
behaviour, such as physical threats and aggression.
The prediction of a similar cognitive proﬁle in
terms of ToM abilities and social competence between
frontal lesion subjects and schizophrenic people has
been investigated and conﬁrmed [6, 7]. An extensive
and careful review recently published [32], reported a
general agreement about the nature and extension of
ToM dysfunctions in people affected by schizophre-
nia. These dysfunctions are symptoms related [33],
disease speciﬁc and state independent.
The neural architecture of the social cognitive
dysfunction of schizophrenia is of paradigmatic
importance for the understanding of social cognitive
dysfunction and, more importantly, for the under-
standing of the consequences at the behavioural level
[34]. A previous seminal study provided evidence that
structural orbitofrontal cortex abnormalities are re-
lated to social dysfunction in schizophrenic people
[35]. Moreover this prefrontal area has been
unequivocally involved in the social cognitive deﬁcits
associated with this disorder [36].
However, empirically controlled investigations in
which the cognitive proﬁle of brain damaged patients
was compared with schizophrenic subjects with an
appropriate set of ToM and social intelligence tasks
are lacking, thus leaving several crucial questions
largely unresolved.
In the current study, we examined the performance
of stabilized schizophrenic outpatients, inpatients
with focal damage of left and right ventromedial
prefrontal lobes and healthy controls, in ToM abili-
ties, in social competence and tactical strategy
(Machiavellian Intelligence), to clarify whether
schizophrenic patients demonstrate impairment sim-
ilar to ventromedial prefrontal lesion patients and
whether their performance in these tasks can be dif-
ferentiated from their performance in tasks sensitive
to neuropsychological dysfunction, including ‘‘exec-
13utive’’ functions. Our prediction is that an overlap-
ping dysfunctional cognitive proﬁle should emerge
between brain damaged and schizophrenic subjects,
when compared to healthy subjects. We also ad-
dressed several methodological issues raised by ear-
lier studies using social cognition tasks created for
adults and not for children.
Methods
j Participants
The subjects for this study included 18 adult neurosurgical patients
with unilateral frontal lobe lesions who had undergone surgery at
the Department of Neurosurgery of ‘‘S. Salvatore’’ Hospital,
L’Aquila, Italy. The patients were consecutively enrolled in the
study from January 2003 to September 2005.
Only patients with exclusive frontal lesions were identiﬁed and
brain damage was conﬁrmed through neuroimaging, with pre- and
postoperative CT scanning and MRIs.
Nine subjects with left side medial prefrontal cortex (LMPFC)
lesions and nine subjects with right side medial prefrontal cortex
(RMPFC) lesions were studied and underwent neuropsychological
examinations (Fig. 1A, B).
Thirteen subjects had intra- or extra-axial tumours (72%); 3
had spontaneous haemorrhage (17%) and 2 (11%) had intracere-
bral haemorrhage from ruptured aneurysms.
In the RMPFC group seven patients had a tumour removed
(four had a meningioma excised, 2 had a high grade glioma excised
and 1 had an oligodendroglioma excised), one had a right anterior
communicating artery (ACoA) aneurysm clipped, following rupture
and one had spontaneous intracerebral haemorrhage with no evi-
dence of arterial malformations. Of the LMPFC patients, six had a
tumour removed (ﬁve had a meningioma excised and one had a
high grade astrocytoma excised), two had spontaneous intracere-
bral haemorrhage with no evidence of arterial malformations and
one had a left ACoA aneurysm clipped following rupture.
The location of the experimental group’s lesions were deﬁned
anatomically as medial (Broadman area 9 and 46) and orbital
(Broadman areas 10, 11, 12 and 25) and further classiﬁed according
to the prefrontal sectors of functional signiﬁcance into which the
lesions encroached (Tables 1, 2).
Subjects were assessed with neuropsychological test batteries
20–40 days after surgery.
A control group of schizophrenic subjects and a control group
of psychiatrically and neurologically healthy subjects were studied
as well.
Twenty male patients, all native Italian speakers, whose symp-
toms satisﬁed the DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia [37], partici-
pated in the study. They were all patients of the Department of
Psychiatry of the University of L’Aquila and diagnosis was re-
conﬁrmed on admission to (and 6 months after discharge from) the
Day-Hospital (DH) using a non-structured interview conducted by
two psychiatrists (M.C., R.R) referring to DSM-IV criteria.
All the subjects, whose assessment took place when clinically
stable within a month of admission to the DH and establishment/
conﬁrmation of diagnosis, were treated with maintenance anti-
psychotic drugs. The mean daily dose was 310.3 (SD 143.67) mg/
equivalents of Chlorpromazine [38]; this dose-equivalence with a
typical antipsychotic is necessary in order to compare the different
antipsychotic drugs as their strength may be different when
administered to patients.
Twenty neurologically and psychiatrically healthy control sub-
jects (matched for age and education) were included. Exclusion
criteria were: history of neurological disease including epilepsy,
head trauma or mental retardation. All subjects provided informed
consent to participate in the study.
Materials and procedure
j Clinical assessment
Clinical assessment in the sample with MPFC lesions was per-
formed by using a non-structured clinical interview and Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) version 4.0 translated into Italian
by [39] and through the neuropsychiatric Inventory (NPI), a
semistructured clinicians interview using the protocol described
by [40].
For the schizophrenic sample, frequency and severity of current
symptomatology was registered by using a non-structured clinical
interview and Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) version
4.0 (Modiﬁed 24-item version, translated into Italian by [39] and
Clinical Global Impression scale (CGI) [40].
The prevalent symptomatology was also investigated using
the Scale for the assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; [41])
and Scale for the assessment of Negative Symptoms (SANS;
[42]).
The SAPS consists of 34 items and is divided into four sub-
scales: hallucinations, delusions, bizarre behaviour and formal
thought disorder. The SANS consists of 25 items and is designed to
measure ﬁve domains: affective ﬂattening or blunting, alogia,
apathy, asociality and impaired attention.
We also evaluated social function with AD-Disability Assess-
ment [40]. Socio-demographic and clinical data are reported in
Table 3.
Fig. 1 (A) MRI T1 weight (axial view) with
gadolinium showing low density abnormalities
(meningioma excised, patients L.F.) orbitofrontal
cortex on the left side. (B) CT scan image showing
low density abnormalities (meningioma excised,
patients L.G.) orbitofrontal cortex on right sides
14j Neuropsychological assessment
All the schizophrenic subjects, with the exception of two
positive schizophrenics, were also administered three neuropsy-
chological tests for assessment of executive functions: the WCST,
the Tower of London Test and a Phonemic Verbal Fluency Test
(Table 4).
The WCST (128 cards) was administered with standard
instructions, as described by Spreen and Strauss [43], whereas
scoring followed Heaton’s [44] rules. Scoring and administration
instructions for the Tower of London Test were those described by
Krikorian et al. [45]. Scoring and administration instructions of the
Phonemic Verbal Fluency Test were those described by Novelli
et al. [46].
Visuo-spatial intellectual level was assessed by means of Ra-
ven’s Progressive Matrices [47].
j Theory of mind tasks
Four stories were read to the participants individually to assess ToM
competence. The stories were structured to assess the ability to
understand ﬁrst and second order false beliefs in adult subjects [9].
First order false beliefs require a subject to make an inference about
the state of the world. To assess ﬁrst order ToM two stories were
used: The washing machine task [9] and The Cigarette Task [48].
Second order stories measure the capacity to understand other
people’s false beliefs. To assess second order ToM two stories were
used; The Burglar [49] and The Wallpaper Story [9]. These stories
were presented to the subjects in a series of cartoons in which the
various actions of the characters are depicted in sequences.
All the subjects were asked a ToM question and three control
questions:
False belief test question. This was designed to elicit a response that
demonstrated the ability to make inferences about another indi-
vidual’s mental state, namely, that a character in the story holds a
false belief.
Fact question. This was posed to determine whether subjects
understood the actual sequence of relevant events that had occurred
in the story which is in contrast with the sequence as understood by
oneofthecharactersinthestoryandthatleadstohiscomingtoafalse
conclusion.
Memory question. This was used to assess whether memory for
story details was approximately intact. The stories were the same
for all the subjects examined. Each subject obtained a score ranging
from 0 to 1 in the case of a correct answer to a False-belief question,
to the fact question and to the memory question, where
0 = incorrect answer; 1 = correct answer. If the subject gave a
correct answer to both the ﬁrst order stories, s/he had a global
score for ﬁrst order ToM equal to 1 (non-casual performance).
For second order false belief stories we followed the same methods.
j Social cognition tasks
The following tasks addressed two aspects of social cognition.
The ability to process the appropriateness of behaviour in dif-
ferent social contexts [21]; and the ability to use tactical strategy
(Machiavellian Intelligence).
Social situations task
This task investigates the capacity to judge the appropriateness of
behaviour that may induce anger in observers.
Table 1 Socio-demographic details
of subjects with ventromedial frontal
lobe lesions
Subjects Site Age Education Aetiology
M.D Right frontal lesion 56 13 Meningioma
F.S. Right frontal lesion 50 8 Meningioma
L.G Right frontal lesion 44 8 Meningioma
P.G. Right frontal lesion 63 5 Oligodendroglioma
T.R Right frontal lesion 62 5 Glioma grade III
E.G Right frontal lesion 69 8 Spontaneous intracerebral haemorrhage
S.M Right frontal lesion 64 13 Glioma grade IV
A.U Right frontal lesion 35 18 Intra-cerebral haemorrhage from aneurismal sac rupture
M.U Right frontal lesion 44 18 Meningioma
L.F Left frontal lesion 41 8 Meningioma
L.P Left frontal lesion 30 5 Meningioma
M.N Left frontal lesion 68 13 Spontaneous intra-cerebral haemorrhage
M.M. Left frontal lesion 55 13 Spontaneous intra-cerebral haemorrhage
R.M Left frontal lesion 54 8 Meningioma
D.S Left frontal lesion 62 8 Meningioma
R.T Left frontal lesion 73 13 Astrocytoma grade III
A.C Left frontal lesion 59 8 Meningioma
R.G Left frontal lesion 38 8 Intra-cerebral haemorrhage from aneurismal sac rupture
Table 2 Classification of the RMPFC and LMPFC experimental group according
to the prefrontal sectors of functional significance into which the lesions en-
croached
Patient Sex Age
(years)
Aetiology Lesion location
Fronto-orbital Medial
RF1 F 56 Meningioma +
RF2 F 50 Meningioma +
RF3 M 44 Meningioma +
RF4 F 63 Oligodendroglioma +
RF5 M 62 Glioma grade III +
RF6 M 69 SIH +
RF7 F 64 Glioma grade IV +
RF8 F 35 IhAsc +
RF9 M 44 Meningioma +
LF1 M 41 Meningioma +
LF2 M 30 Meningioma +
LF3 F 68 SIH +
LF4 M 55 SIH +
LF5 M 54 Meningioma +
LF6 M 62 Meningioma +
LF7 M 73 Astrocytoma grade III +
LF8 F 59 Meningioma +
LF9 M 38 IhAsc +
SIH = spontaneous intracerebral haemorrhage; IhAsc = intracerebral haemor-
rhage from aneurismal sac rupture
15Procedure. Nine short stories describing social situations
incorporating behaviour were read by the patient. At various points
in each story, the patient was asked to comment on how appropriate
the behaviour was, giving a score from A toD. ‘‘A’’ scores meant that
he judged the situation as normative. ‘‘B’’ to ‘‘D’’ scores meant that
he judged the situation as a norm violation and indexed the extentof
the violation (‘‘B’’ scores being mild and ‘‘D’’ being serious). Blair
and Cipollotti [21] report that previous piloting on a large, inde-
pendent sample of healthy controls had resulted in the identiﬁcation
ofasetofconsistentlyidentiﬁednormativesituationsandviolations.
Two scores were obtained for this task: one referring to the
number of normative situations and the other to the number of vio-
lationscorrectlyidentiﬁed.Thethirdreferstotheextenttowhichthe
patient judged the violations to be socially inappropriate.
For each situation, the participant obtained a score between
0 and 3, matching their response of ‘‘A’’ to ‘‘D’’ (i.e. ‘‘A’’ = 0,
‘‘D’’ = 3).
j Mach IV Scale
We used the Mach IV Scale to assess the ‘‘Machiavellian Intelli-
gence’’ of participants [50]. This is a self-report Likert scale, with
scores ranging from 1 to 7 (where 1 = I totally disagree; 4 = no
opinion; 7 = I totally agree), composed of 20 items, each consisting
of a statement.
The Mach IV scale is a method for assessing awareness and
social functioning in a social context characterised by interpersonal
deception (‘‘Machiavellianism’’).
From the 20 statements of the Mach IV Scale we extracted two
groups of items: (1) 5 items describing duplicity tactics, e.g.: ‘‘It is
wise to ﬂatter important people’’ (‘‘tactics+’’) and (2) 4 items
describing a disagreements with tactics duplicity, e.g.: ‘‘When you
ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real
reason’’ (‘‘tactics)’’).
The items were labelled for coding as follows:
Positive tactics (tactics+): subjects must agree with statements
reporting the ability to manipulate other people’s intentions and
actions, according to Niccolo ` Machiavelli’s beliefs.
Negative tactics (tactics)): subjects must agree with statements
reporting judgements of correct and honest behaviour; for this
reason they cannot use ‘‘intentional deception’’ mechanisms in-
volved in the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis. These features
depend on an accurate interpretation of even the most particular
intention of respondents [32, 51].
Human nature components referring to ‘‘people’s knowledge’’,
in particular the degree of cynicism concerning other people’s
intentions and decisions are strictly related to the ability to inter-
pret other people’s mental states.
j Statistical analysis
One-way ANOVA was used to compare demographic, clinical
information and neuropsychological Assessment and social cog-
nition tasks. The Kruskaal ± Wallis test was used to analyse the
level of signiﬁcance of patients’ scores on ToM tasks.
Results
No differences among groups emerged for age
[F(3,40) = 0.271, P = 0.751], years of education
[F(3,38) = 0.387, P = 0.51] and estimated IQ
[F(3,38) = 0.44, P = 0.64] (Table 2).
j Clinical assessment
Neither were differences found between the four
subgroups in age [F(3,38) = 0.271, P = 0.751, sex ra-
tio, standard of education [F(3,38) = 0.387, P = 0.51],
IQ [F(3,38) = 0.387, P = 0.51], in BPRS total scores
Table 3 Socio demographic, clinical
details in the total sample Schizophrenia
(no. 20)
Right medial
prefrontal cortex
lesion (no. 9)
Left medial
prefrontal cortex
lesion (no. 9)
Healthy
controls
(no. 20)
Sex (M:F) 7:13 5:4 2:7 15:6
Age (years) 42.7 (1.8) 49.6 (10.3) 46.4 (18.6) 38.9 (2.8)
Education (years) 8.8 (0.8) 9.2 (2.6) 12.2 (3.97) 13.4 (1.2)
Day since surgery – 91.4 (11.6) 88.8 (13.7) –
IQ level 88.8 (5.7) 93.1 (2.4) 98.7 (3.6) –
NPI total score 6 (0) 10 (0) 9.8 (5.3) –
Duration of illness (years) 12.30 (4.13) – – –
BPRS total score 44 (11.1) 52.5 (4.9) 55.5 (17.5) –
C.G.I. 4.5 (0.6) – – –
SANS 50.42 (20.9) – – –
SAPS 42.57 (19.1) – – –
Social function (AD) 2.5 (1.1) – – –
The values are means; standard deviation are in parenthesis
Table 4 Neuropsychological detailed
of total sample Schizophrenia
(no. 20)
Right medial prefrontal
cortex lesion (no. 9)
Left medial prefrontal
cortex lesion (no. 9)
Healthy controls
(no. 20)
Verbal fluency 33.1 (10.4) 21.2 (8.39) 11.3 (4.19) 38.7 (7.5)
Tower of London 29.8 (4.4) 26.3 (6.5) 19.2 (4.3) 34.6 (1.9)
WCST no. of category 3.46 (2.41) 2.66 (1.7) 1.87 (2.1) 5.7 (0.3)
WCST % of perseverative errors 27.66 (15.12) 42.9 (22.6) 50.7 (21.3) 2.9 (2.6)
Verbal memory 19.1 (8.7) 28.6 (8.01) 8.3 (2.25) 29.6 (3.01)
The values are means; standard deviation are in parenthesis
16[F(3,38) = 0.345, P = 0.72] and in NPI total score
[F(3,38) = 0.748, P = 0.508].
j Executive function
The three groups differed signiﬁcantly in the planning
Tower of London task [F(3,40) = 22.568, P = 0.000];
Verbal Fluency [F(3,40) = 40.023, P = 0.000], and No.
of categories achieved in the WCST [F(3,40) = 9.578,
P = 0.000] and perseverative errors [F(3,40) = 10.694,
P = 0.000]. The performance data for the four groups
on the tests of executive functioning are shown in
Table 3.
The LSD method was used for post hoc compari-
sons. This revealed that in Verbal Fluency both
frontal groups (LMPFC and RMPFC) performed sig-
niﬁcantly worse than the schizophrenic group and
control subjects. Bonferroni tests on the Tower of
London task showed impaired performance for the
LMPFC group only when compared to both the
schizophrenic and healthy subjects control groups.
The LMPFC group performed signiﬁcantly worse than
the RMPFC subjects.
First-order false belief tasks
False-belief test question: Groups differed signiﬁcantly
on the non-parametric Kruskall–Wallis test:
v
2(3) = 14.664, df = 3, P < 0.002. Post hoc (Bonfer-
roni methods) comparisons showed that the RMPFC
group’s performance, differed signiﬁcantly from that
of the LMPFC (RMPFC vs. LMPFC mean differ-
ences = )0.665; P < 0.005) but not from schizo-
phrenic subgroups, and that the overall percentage of
correct scores for patient groups was signiﬁcantly
lower than those of the normal control group.
Fact questions: The percentage of correct scores
revealed no signiﬁcant overall differences between
groups.
Memory questions: The percentage of correct scores
showed no signiﬁcant group differences (Fig. 2).
Second order theory of mind
False-belieftest question: Groups differedsigniﬁcantly:
Kruskall–Wallis v
2(3) = 11.72, df = 3, P = 0.008).
Post hoc (Bonferroni methods) analyses revealed the
most impaired performance for the RF and schizo-
phrenia groups when compared to LMPFC (LMPFC vs.
RMPFC mean differences = )0.598; P < 0.007;
LMPFC vs. schizophrenics mean differences = )0.623;
P < 0.000). However the overall percentage of correct
scores for patient groups was signiﬁcantly lower than
those of the normal control group.
Fact questions: The percentage of correct scores
revealed no signiﬁcant overall difference between the
groups.
Memory questions: The percentage of correct
scores showed no signiﬁcant group differences
(Fig. 3).
Social situation task
The ANOVA comparison between RMPFC, LMPFC,
schizophrenics and healthy controls showed statisti-
cally signiﬁcant differences in the ability to identify
normative situations [F(3,58) = 3.179, P = 6.073].
Post hoc (Bonferroni methods) comparisons
showed that the RMPFC group’s performance, dif-
fered signiﬁcantly from that of the LMPFC (RMPFC
vs. LMPFC mean differences = )1.904; P < 0.001;
      = p<0,005 
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Fig. 2 Performance of study groups (schizophrenics, Right Medial Prefrontal
Cortex—RMPFC Lesion Subjects, Left Medial Prefrontal Cortex—LMPFC Lesion
Subjects and healthy controls) on First-order False Belief tasks
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Fig. 3 Performance of study groups (schizophrenics, Right Medial Prefrontal
Cortex—RMPFC Lesion Subjects, Left Medial Prefrontal Cortex—LMPFC Lesion
Subjects and healthy controls) on second-order False Belief tasks
17LMPFC vs. schizophrenics mean differences = 1.623;
P < 0.002) and healthy controls but not from
schizophrenics. There were no signiﬁcant differences
between the four groups in the total score of the norm
violations (Fig. 4).
Mach IV scale
The ANOVA comparison between RMPFC, LMPFC,
schizophrenics and healthy controls showed statis-
tically signiﬁcant differences on the following Mach
IV items (tactics+) item ‘‘Trusting someone means
getting into trouble’’ [F(3,58) = 3.179, P = 0.035];
(tactics+) ‘‘It’s hard to be successful without taking
short-cuts’’ [F(3,58) = 3.959, P = 0.000]; (tactics))
‘‘There is no need to deceive anyone’’
[F(3,58) = 7.759, P = 0.021]; (tactics)) ‘‘It is possi-
ble to be good in all situations’’ [F(3,58) = 3.406,
P = 0.027]. Post hoc multiple comparison (Bonfer-
roni methods) showed that RMPFC score lower for
items indicating agreement in strategic thinking
(tactics+); than LMPFC, schizophrenics and controls
showed higher scores for items indicating dis-
agreement with strategic thinking (Tactics). Results
are displayed in Fig. 5.
Correlation analyses
No signiﬁcant correlations were found between ToM
ﬁrst order and ToM second order questions and
executive functions (verbal ﬂuency, WCST number of
categories and perseverative errors, Tower of London)
in normal controls, and in subjects with left and right
frontal lesions.
No signiﬁcant correlations were found between the
Mach IV scales (good tactical strategy and negative
tactical strategy) and executive functions (verbal ﬂu-
ency, WCST no. of categories and perseverative er-
rors, Tower of London) in normal controls, and in
subjects with left and right MPFC.
There was a signiﬁcant correlation between ﬁrst
order ToM scores and duration of illness (r = )0.375;
P < 0.029); between ﬁrst order ToM scores and SANS
total scores (r = )0.562; P < 0.03); between ﬁrst order
and second order ToM scores and social functioning
total scores (AD) (ﬁrst order = )0.489; P < 0.036;
second order r = )0.543; P < 0.029).
The signiﬁcant correlation was also found in the
schizophrenic sample between ToM performances
and verbal ﬂuency (r = )0.527; P < 0.000).
No signiﬁcant correlations were found between the
Mach IV scale and social cognition task and psycho-
pathological and clinical variable (SANS, SAPS and
CGI).
Discussion
One of the distinctive attributes of human social
cognition is our propensity to build models of other
people’s minds: to make inferences about the mental
states of others. Several neuroimaging studies have
attempted to elucidate the neural substrates that
support this distinctively human ability that is im-
paired in people with schizophrenia.
The main aim of the present paper is to establish
whether patients affected by schizophrenia show an
impairment in several social cognitive tasks as dem-
onstrated in other researches [5, 52–54] and if this
cognitive proﬁle is comparable to patients with a
unilateral brain lesion involving orbito-ventromedial
areas of the frontal lobes.
Our results are in line with other studies: in people
with schizophrenia there was an impairment of social
cognitive abilities and this deﬁcit appears to be re-
lated to negative symptomatology [55] and to be a key
P<0,001 
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Fig. 4 Performances on social situation task in all groups (schizophrenics,
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Fig. 5 Performance on items of Mach IV Scale in the four groups for strategic
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18determinant of functional outcome, including social
outcome [56]. It has been suggested that theory of
mind deﬁcit make unable schizophrenic subjects to
interact effectively with their social environment, but
that a lack of certain aspects of social cognition will
lead to social misperceptions.
In addition to these clinical and outcome goals,
there is increasing interest in identifying the neural
substrates that underlie social cognitive deﬁcits in
schizophrenia. For all of these reasons we compared
the performances on social cognition tasks of
schizophrenic subjects with the performances of
MPFC subjects.
Among the several studies which investigated the
effects of frontal lobe lesions (dorsolateral and ven-
tromedial/orbital) on performance in ToM tasks [9–
11, 57–59], some of these including patients with
bilateral frontal lobe damage, are limited because of a
lack of detailed anatomical speciﬁcation of lesion
location [10, 11, 57]. Moreover, most of patients with
bilateral lesions had suffered head trauma, an aetiol-
ogy associated with rather diffuse brain damage that
is particularly likely to impinge on orbitofrontal brain
areas.
Thus, the present study strictly tests the hypothesis
that the unilateral (right or left) medial frontal cortex
is implicated in the neural network sub serving ToM
[8] which is based on well established evidences
suggesting the implication of the ventromedial frontal
lobe areas in playing a critical role in a dedicated
‘‘mentalizing’’ or ToM network in human brains ([7,
28, 60] for a review).
We found out that subjects with RMPFC lesion are
impaired in ToM tasks of ‘‘false beliefs’’, showing thus
a very similar cognitive dysfunctional proﬁle to peo-
ple affected by schizophrenia in all Theory of Mind
tasks and in all social cognition tasks. A normal
performance on control questions indicates an
unimpaired comprehension of stories and suggest
that the task was sensitive in detecting TOM impair-
ments.
In addition, schizophrenics and subjects with
RMPFC lesion also showed impairment in the social
cognition tasks, in fact they both failed to discrimi-
nate in judging inappropriate behaviour likely to
induce anger in observers. This was unlike patients
with LMPFC who showed no impairment on any of
these tasks.
This is clear evidence that the medial frontal cortex
plays a critical role in a dedicated ‘‘mentalizing’’ brain
network that underpins ToM ability [7, 8].
Our ﬁndings are in agreement with previous ‘‘le-
sional’’ studies, showing the association between right
medial area damage and more severe ToM deﬁcits
[11, 13]. Siegal et al. [13] reported that ToM impair-
ments seem to be associated with right hemisphere
damage.
In the present study we report a dissociation in
RMPFC damage patients who displayed a defective
ToM performance in contrast to LMPFC patients.
LMPCF subjects show lower performances than
RMPCF subjects in other cognitive competences but
have normal performance in ToM competences and
our results conﬁrm the results obtained by Siegal and
Surian [61].
In addition, when a more sophisticated social
ability is required in order to perform second order
false belief tasks correctly, also LMPFC damaged
subjects fail to perform at a normal level and show a
statistically signiﬁcant impairment, even though to a
lesser degree, when compared to subjects with
RMPFC and schizophrenic people. A possible expla-
nation is that LMPFC is involved in more sophisti-
cated mentalizing tasks and that an intact right
hemisphere structure is nevertheless required [58].
Normal subjects and neurosurgical subjects with
unilateral LMPFC lesions perform fairly well on tasks
related to tactical strategy, showing correspondingly
low scores on the ingenuity aspect of thinking.
The present study also provides further data on the
neural prefrontal areas involved in social cognition
tasks and in strategic thinking [21]. Social efﬁciency is
represented by the ability to understand the inten-
tions and beliefs of others with the aim of deceiving
and manipulating them to achieve relevant objectives,
such as control of food sources or sexual partners
[26]. Recent literature fosters that these abilities are
localised in the frontal cortex [27, 28]; the ability to
recognise and manipulate hierarchical states to
achieve some advantage would be localised in the
amygdala and right hemisphere [62].
Schizophrenic people and subjects with RMPFC
lesion showed impaired performance on tactical
strategy associated with relatively ‘‘high levels’’ of
social ingenuity and have an impaired ability to access
‘‘social schema knowledge’’ which is stored in the
frontal lobes [31]. Such patients cannot access social
schema knowledge and fail to inhibit aberrant
behaviour, such as physical threats and aggression [21,
63]. Interestingly a completely reversed pattern char-
acterizes the performance of LMPFC lesion subjects
and healthy controls, in fact we found out a complete
disassociation of the neural prefrontal areas located in
the medial part of the hemisphere in sub serving hu-
man ability to think strategically, indicating that the
cortical organization related to tactical aspects of
Machiavellian Intelligence is lateralized to the right
hemisphere [64]. Our results are at slight variance with
the pioneering study of Rowe et al. [9] who found a
signiﬁcantly impaired performance of both the
RMPFC and LMPFC subjects in ﬁrst and second order
ToM tasks. In this study cortical lesions were non-
exclusive medial hemisphere but includes subjects
with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPC) damage.
Studies of normal subjects have used a variety of
imaging techniques, designs, and test materials, but
especially PET and fMRI to deﬁne brain regions
speciﬁcally activated during a ToM task [8, 65]. Such
19studies have consistently shown activation of the
medial prefrontal gyrus (MPFG) and the Temporo
Parietal Junction.
Frith and Frith [7], reporting data on studies car-
ried out in adults, have revealed an MPFC system of
three components that are consistently activated
during both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks.
This brain region is probably the basis of the de-
coupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state
representations from physical state representations.
We can speculate, according to the Edelman model
[66, 67], that a hierarchical organization of mental
operation, when disrupted at a speciﬁed level, impairs
the integrity of ﬁnal output via an interruption of the
chain of events required to perform a task. This study
is limited by the small number of patients with uni-
lateral frontal lobe lesions due to the rarity of such
lesion.
Despite this limitation, this study provides further
evidence that social competence is compromised in
RMPFC subjects very closely to schizophrenics and
these data seem to elucidate the possible neuroan-
atomic structure alteration present in schizophrenia.
However, we are conﬁdent that there is a wide range
of behavioural manifestations of frontal lobe dys-
function, and ToM impairments clearly cannot ac-
count for all of these, nor is it likely to be responsible
for all reported difﬁculties in social cognition. In
contrast, ToM tests are designed with the aim of
isolating those aspects of social cognition associated
with two-way reciprocal interactions that rely cru-
cially on ToM ability and false belief tasks have
facilitated the demonstration of a mentalizing
impairment in subjects with lesions of the prefrontal
cortex, which is independent of non-mental state
inference.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings provide evidence that
lesions to the right MPCF determine an incapacity to
understand ToM ‘‘false belief’’ stories and to use
tactical strategy and understanding of social schema.
Other authors have reported the same results: subjects
with right hemisphere damage, but not subjects with
left hemisphere damage, had difﬁculties in perform-
ing simple theory of mind tasks [13, 68].
The difﬁculties shared by subjects with right
hemisphere damage and young children on ToM tasks
may have a similar origin [61]. These may both derive
from a pragmatic deﬁcit that prevents subjects from
interpreting the implicit questions correctly, rather
than from a conceptual deﬁcit concerning the ability
to represent mental states.
The response pattern of subjects with ventromedial
prefrontal damage on ToM tasks adds new evidence
to the growing literature on the effects of the right
hemisphere on various pragmatic aspects of language
production and comprehension [13].
The good performance of subjects with RMPCF
lesions in executive function and verbal memory tasks
suggests that their difﬁculties are due to a reduced
sensitivity to the constraints that guide the interpre-
tation and production of contextually appropriate
utterances [61].
It may be concluded that the ToM disorder in
RMPCF subjects does not stem from executive func-
tion or memory deﬁcits and that deﬁcits in ToM and
executive functioning in subjects with frontal lobe
lesions are not causally related, even though our
ﬁndings are in disagreement with Channon and
Crawford [69] who found a relationship between
executive functioning and ToM ability in adults with
damage to the frontal lobes [70].
We support two positions: ﬁrst, that a specialized,
discrete ToM module, or set of modules, is located in
the frontal lobes, but is functionally independent and
second that these deﬁcits can co-occur, on the basis of
the proximity of the respective underlying neural
areas.
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